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FINTECH: ANTIDOTE TO RENT-SEEKING?
JEREMY KIDD, J.D., PH.D.*
“Innovations in Financial Technology (fintech) have the potential to fun-
damentally change the financial services industry and the wider econo-
my.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Fintech is a reality of our modern society,2 and will likely become 
even more so in the future. Peer-to-peer lending,3 cybercurrencies,4 smart 
contracts,5 algorithmic lending,6 and more, have required adaptation by 
* Associate Professor, Mercer University School of Law. Thanks to participants at the #FutureLaw
Workshop 2.0 for helpful comments and suggestions.
1.  NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A FRAMEWORK FOR FINTECH 1
(2017).
2.  “Taken at its broadest, FinTech is shorthand for ‘innovation in financial services,’ whether
that means new products from new startups, or the adoption of new approaches by existing players 
where technology is the key enabler.” Wayne M. Kennard, IP Strategies in a Competitive Fintech 
Marketplace, FINTECH L. REP., July/Aug. 2014, at 1. Of course, to be fair, there have been innovations 
in financial “technology”—understood broadly—for centuries, probably starting with letters of credit, 
negotiable instruments, and so on. This article will use the terms in its common parlance, denoting 
application of high-tech innovations to the financial sector.
3.  Sometimes known as online social lending, peer-to-peer lending allows individuals to borrow
and lend money without using a financial intermediary. For a description of the industry, including the
ways that financial intermediaries are also participating, see Amy Cortese, Loans that Avoid Banks? 
Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2014, at BU1. Currently popular examples are prosper.com, lend-
ingclub.com, peerform.com, and upstart.com.
4.  Bitcoin is the most well-known cryptocurrency, e.g., Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innova-
tive Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 160–61 (2012), but other exam-
ples include Etherium, Ripple, and Litecoin. For a more extensive list, see Cryptocurrency Market 
Capitalizations, COINMARKETCAP (Sept. 30, 2017, 9:30 PM),
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/views/all/ [https://perma.cc/H9MY-WTUS]. Cryptocurrencies are 
defined by their virtual-only existence and lack of a central repository, limiting the ability of govern-
ments to control their use and movement. Paulo Tasca, Digital Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportu-
nities, and Risks 22–28 (Sept. 7, 2015) (ECUREX Research Working Paper), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2657598 [http://perma.cc/BZA7-3UNK]. Verification of ownership and 
transaction history occurs through blockchain technology. Id. at 5. The blockchain innovation is a 
complicated one to explain, but for a valiant attempt at simplifying, see Gerald P. Dwyer, Blockchain: 
A Primer (Dec. 30, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2900450
[http://perma.cc/Q8SH-VBQF]. 
5.  Smart contracts are contracts converted to computer code that are self-executing upon the
attainment of certain criteria. Maria Letizia Perugini & Paolo Dal Checco, Smart Contracts: A Prelimi-
166 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 93:1 
consumers and producers of financial services. Our modes of doing busi-
ness will continue to be challenged and changed by these and other Fintech 
innovations,7 almost certainly expanding beyond merely “promot[ing] fi-
nancial inclusion, expand[ing] access to capital for individuals and small 
businesses, and more broadly reshap[ing] how society interacts with finan-
cial services.”8 By reducing transaction costs,9 advancing technology opens 
the doors to innovations the likes of which we might not even be able to 
comprehend.10 The natural opacity of the future precludes precise predic-
tions, but not general forecasts regarding likely trends.
This essay proposes one such forecast—the rise and expansion of 
Fintech is going to make life difficult for two groups: (1) financial regula-
tors; and (2) incumbents within the regulated industries. Regulators are 
likely to see their workload increase because the rate of innovation is 
speeding up, requiring them to do their job more rapidly but, ideally, with-
out any loss of accuracy and efficacy. Many Fintech observers have argued 
that technological innovation is likely to increase beyond the capacity of 
regulation to keep pace.11 If true, the task of regulation becomes even hard-
nary Evaluation, 10–11 (Dec. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2729548 
[http://perma.cc/X54A-DDMW]. 
6.  Algorithmic lending is the use of machine learning to identify and eliminate inefficient crite-
ria for judging creditworthiness of potential borrowers, allowing lenders to identify profitable lending 
opportunities that would have been missed in the past. See Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and 
Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, ???.
7. These innovations might be disruptive to existing institutions, e.g., Brian Wolfe & Woongsun?
Yoo, Crowding Out Banks: Credit Substitution by Peer-to-Peer Lending (July 11, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3000593 [http://perma.cc/G6W4-QUVK ]
(finding that smaller community banks experience reduced borrowing as Fintech firms increase);
or they may be complementary, e.g., Calebe de Roure et al., How Does P2P Lending Fit into the Con-
sumer Credit Market? (Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion Paper No. 30/2016,
2016), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/144836/1/865628904.pdf [https://
perma.cc/46JP-SUSN] (finding that loans issued by peer-to-peer lenders in Germany were riskier
than those of traditional lenders, indicating that credit expands under peer-to-peer lending). For a
more comprehensive descrip-tion of the various forms of Fintech and the ways in which they might
change the financial services landscape in the short run, see ALAN MCQUINN ET AL., INFO. TECH. &
INNOVATION FOUND., POLICY PRINCIPLES FOR FINTECH 2 (2016), https://itif.org/
publications/2016/10/18/policy-principles-fintech [https://perma.cc/HNY8-GW8A].
8.  NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 1. 
9.  “Transaction costs” is the admittedly obscure name given to the many obstacles that can stand
in the way of voluntary transactions. Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 144–
45 (2014) [hereinafter Kidd, Coase].
10.  See Karen Elliott et al., Unruly Innovation: Distributed Ledgers, Blockchains and the Protec-
tion of Transaction Rights 2 (Dec. 22, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888872 [https://perma.cc/S5LS-4WCQ] (“[T]echnologies that enable dis-
tributed electronic transmission of financial value (such as a cryptocurrency like bitcoin) are a different 
type of disruptive technologies that not only provide combinatorial innovation but also change the very 
rules of the market by self-writing them and thus by self-deregulating themselves.” (emphasis added)). 
11.  See Matthew D. Cutts & Brandon C. Romain, The Future of FinTech: A Washington Perspec-
tive, FINTECH L. REP., Nov./Dec. 2016, at NL 1 (“FinTech firms . . . pose challenges for regulators since 
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er, perhaps impossible. Correspondingly, regulated incumbents will find 
their business model disrupted to the extent that it involves their using reg-
ulation as a way of crowding out competition in order to protect profit mar-
gins and market share.
Outside of the board rooms of large financial entities, the second ef-
fect will likely be cheered, since increased competition and lower profit 
margins mean consumers keep more of their hard-earned money.12 The 
first effect will be far more controversial, due to the concerns that unregu-
lated markets generate in all but the most devout proponents of free mar-
kets.13 This article will articulate a general defense of free markets but, 
more importantly, will explain why the potential costs of deregulated mar-
kets would be at least partially offset by a reduction in the distortions and 
costs associated with cronyism and agency capture by large financial insti-
tutions. In other words, a deregulated market might not be as bad as it first 
appears if it reduces corruption and cronyism in the regulatory process.
Section II will offer a basic primer on rent-seeking, a concept from 
public choice economics that describes how the well-connected and/or 
well-funded seek special favors from government. Rent seeking is always 
harmful to consumers and, as a result, it is usually hidden or, worse, cov-
ered with grand pronouncements about how the political favors are actually 
necessary to promote some public good, such as safety, stability, avoidance 
of systemic risk, and so on.14 Section II will also provide recent examples 
contained in the largest financial “reform” in our history, the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.15
FinTech companies are not subject to some of the same capital and community reinvestment standards 
applicable to traditional banks.”); Erik Vermeulen et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens when 
Technology is Faster than the Law? 5 (Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2016-024, 
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531 [https://perma.cc/H4SF-8PYR] (“[W]here innovation is quick-
er and the global dissemination of that technology is much faster . . . regulators can often struggle to 
keep up.”).
12. In economic terms, a decrease in profit—producer surplus—corresponds to an increase in 
consumer surplus, the amount of money a consumer has left to spend on other things once the transac-
tion is completed.
13. For a defense of complete deregulation, see DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF 
FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL CAPITALISM (2d ed. 1989), 
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/The_Machinery_of_Freedom_.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A5W-NZHZ]. 
Even supporters of free markets, however, argue that regulation is a “necessary evil” in markets that 
have become increasingly complex over time. E.g., Aulana Peters, The Changing Structure of the 
Financial Services Industry and the Implications for International Securities Regulation, 46 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 525, 526 (1989).
14. Jeremy Kidd, Quacks or Bootleggers: Who’s Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, 75 WASH &
LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Kidd, Hedge Funds].
15. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank] (codified in scattered 
sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
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Section III will explain how Fintech has the potential to curb or even 
eliminate rent-seeking in the financial industry. If regulators cannot keep 
up with innovation, the alphabet-soup of regulatory agencies that are tasked 
with the financial sector16 will be unable to interfere in markets to protect 
incumbents. With no one able to bestow rents, the rent seeking will disap-
pear, greatly benefitting consumers.
Section IV addresses the inevitable and, in many ways, understanda-
ble, concerns about unregulated markets. Beyond the concerns of financial 
regulators,17 many in society will be concerned that regulation is needed to 
keep unprincipled swindlers from taking advantage of consumer ignorance 
and effectively ruining investor confidence in our financial markets.18 Sec-
tion IV will offer a brief defense of unregulated markets but will also argue 
that the same harms are inflicted on consumers by regulated—and protect-
ed—incumbents who need not fear competition. In many ways, Fintech 
reduces the need for financial intermediaries, empowering consumers to 
take control of their own financial health and forcing financial companies 
to compete for their money. Section IV will, therefore, argue that regard-
less of where the “optimal” level of regulation used to be, the rise of 
Fintech has shifted the ideal state in the direction of deregulation.
Section V will then offer some conclusions.
II. SPECIAL INTERESTS GET THEIR WAY, EVEN IN THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR
When the government has the ability to hand out special favors, peo-
ple will endeavor to be the ones who receive those favors, spending time 
16. At the level of the federal government, there are: the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), 
which is part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, tasked with regulating federal savings associa-
tions, or “thrifts”; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the part of the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury tasked with overseeing all national banks; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), an independent agency that insures deposits and manages bank failures; the National Credit 
Union Administration (NCUA), an independent agency that oversees federal credit unions and insures 
savings in federal and state-chartered credit unions; the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), an independent agency that regulates commodity futures and options markets; the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), an independent agency that regulates securities markets; the Finan-
cial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a private corporation that acts as a self-regulatory body, 
although all firms and brokers who do business in the U.S. are required by law to be licensed and 
registered by FINRA; and the United States Federal Reserve, the U.S. central bank, that is responsible 
for regulating the entire monetary system to promote price stability and economic growth. Add to that 
list a host of state-level regulatory bodies for banks, securities, and insurance companies.
17. Who may, after all, be motivated by a desire to continue gaining personal benefit in exchange 
for bestowing favors on regulated incumbents.
18. E.g., Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to 
Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 437, 441–42 (2011).
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and money in both honest and nefarious means to achieve that goal.19 To a 
public choice economist, the favors are “rents” and the process of lobbying 
for those favors is “rent-seeking.”20 When politicians of one stripe decry a 
“rigged system”21 and politicians of another stripe complain about “crony-
ism,”22 they are—perhaps without realizing it—making the very same ar-
gument about rent-seeking—that government processes have been 
subverted to benefit those who have managed to curry favor with the right 
legislators or regulators.
Rent-seeking is harmful in two primary ways. First, it distorts markets, 
creating barriers to the type of competition that benefits consumers and 
society. Second, all the time and money spent seeking government favors is 
wasted.23 Whoever wins the competition for government favors will reap 
monopoly profits, so the contest will have a winner, but the contest itself 
uses up resources in pursuit of something that detracts from social well-
being. The contest can yield any number of anticompetitive policies—most 
often, heavy regulations that only large, incumbent corporations can afford 
to comply with, but also subsidies, import restrictions, exclusive licenses, 
19. “Innovations” in this sphere can come from the regulator or the regulated. For example, a 
savvy business owner might recognize a way in which the government can boost profits by harming 
competitors in some way. The business owner will begin trying to convince legislators, regulators, or 
others with relevant authority and power to make the changes necessary to generate those higher profits. 
Alternatively, an entrepreneurial regulator might imagine a rule that could benefit an individual busi-
ness or an industry, if only it were implemented in a particular way. This enterprising regulator could 
then shop the idea around, either in the form of a sales-pitch or as an extortionary threat. See generally
FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL 
EXTORTION (1997).
20. The late economist Gordon Tullock pioneered the rent-seeking concept in the context of 
regulatory agencies, see generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and 
Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967), but the phrase “rent-seeking” was later coined by Anne Kreuger, see 
generally Anne O. Kreuger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
291 (1974).
21. See The Transcript of Bernie Sanders’s Victory Speech, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/10/the-transcript-of-bernie-sanderss-
victory-speech/ [https://perma.cc/C3V9-9LHK].
22. See Senator Mike Lee, Opportunity, Cronyism, and Conservative Reform, Remarks to the 
Heritage Foundation (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/speeches?ID=002a1917-732e-48b4-bd3d-f314b60a9338 
[https://perma.cc/TH3D-QH6J].
23. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 229 (1989). Public choice economics began largely 
with discussions of rent-seeking in the context of monopolies and trade licenses. Businesses asked 
government to imposed barriers to entry, making sure that there was no competition—creating a mo-
nopoly—or to obtain one of only a few import licenses, guaranteeing the ability to charge a much 
higher premium than would be feasible in a competitive market. Tullock, supra note 20, at 228–31. 
Kreuger argues that rent-seeking diminishes social welfare beyond the reductions occurring anytime 
free trade is impeded. Kreuger, supra note 20, at 300–01. A less direct—but no less important—result 
of rent-seeking is a reduction in long-term economic growth, as innovators and entrepreneurs are di-
verted from efforts that will improve growth rates. Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy 
and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.
529, 536 (2015).
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and so on. What rent-seeking cannot do is add to worker productivity or 
lead to new, exciting innovations. Rent-seekers compete only for the right 
to wield the power of government to take from someone else and give to 
the rent-seeker;24 the process leads to nothing of value,25 only to a wasteful 
transfer of wealth.26
What does this mean, in practical terms? As special interests engage in 
rent-seeking, they will attempt to defray those costs by increasing the pric-
es they charge for their goods or services; even the process of seeking fa-
vors will harm consumers.27 In the financial sector, that means lower rates 
of return or higher fees, and that’s only the result of the seeking. When the 
rent-seeking has been completed and favors bestowed, the winners will 
have greater protection from competition. As the invisible hand of market 
competition is obstructed by government intervention, winners have far 
less reason to care what consumers want,28 so consumers will have less 
variety and higher costs.29
How can such a wasteful endeavor continue in a democracy, where 
the electorate should rebel against special benefits and privileges for small 
groups or individuals and the burdens those benefits and privileges impose 
on the rest of society?30 The answer relies on another fundamental insight 
24. Tullock, supra note 20, at 230. 
25. This is not to say that legislative and regulatory processes cannot improve consumer or socie-
tal welfare, but any benefits thus derived are in spite of, rather than because of, the rent-seeking activi-
ties of those who want private benefits for themselves.
26. Transfers themselves cost society nothing, but multiple parties each spend large amounts of 
resources seeking to convince to make the transfer. Spending money just to convince government to 
take your neighbor’s money is wasteful, and when your neighbor is doing it too, the harms are com-
pounded.
27. Remember that rent-seekers haven’t created anything new, haven’t innovated, haven’t im-
proved their product in any way, so the increased cost to consumers is a pure reduction in consumer 
well-being.
28. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
16 (Edwin Caanan ed., Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776) (“[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help 
of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely 
to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage 
to do for him what he requires of them. . . . It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or 
the baker, that we expect our diner, but from their regard to their own interest.”).
29. For example, if government regulation limits the amount of housing that can be provided in 
an area—as with height or occupancy restrictions on buildings—there will be fewer apartments or 
houses to rent. Competitive pressures reduced, landlords can relax their efforts to compete on both 
prices quality margins. Rents will increase and amenities will decrease, because there will be a shortage 
of housing and renters will accept lower-quality apartments at higher rent as an alternative to being 
homeless. In the case of financial serves, the price is typically the interest rate, so borrowers will pay a 
higher interest rate and lenders will receive a lower interest rate. Likewise, consumers of financial 
services will find that they have worse customer service, fewer ways to access and manage their ac-
counts, etc.
30. It is possible to view the Occupy Wall Street movement as precisely this type of revolt. The 
movement did not achieve any noticeable change in the way business is done in Washington and on 
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of public choice economics: the importance of concentrated benefits and 
dispersed costs.31 The costs of rent-seeking are hidden and/or spread across 
society as a whole, so most voters don’t realize the costs or, if they do
know, the burden they bear as an individual is small enough to make the 
results of rent-seeking, at worst, an annoyance.32 Similarly, the benefits of 
rent-seeking are concentrated, so those seeking the rents will be willing to 
expend large sums of money—possibly the entire amount of expected prof-
its—in order to secure government favors.33
Understanding public choice principles leads to a clash of ideas. Regu-
lation—financial or otherwise—is often thought of as a way of correcting 
market failures,34 and is justified on that basis.35 However, regulation can 
Wall Street, although some commentators argue that it is has simply refocused its attention. E.g., Mi-
chael Levitin, The Triumph of Occupy Wall Street, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/the-triumph-of-occupy-wall-street/395408/ 
[https://perma.cc/KF7D-WBMW].
31. Daniel A. Lyons, Public Use, Public Choice and the Urban Growth Machine: Competing 
Political Economies of Takings Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 277 (2009). Mancur Olson dis-
cussed this phenomenon in terms of concentrated interests versus diffuse interests. See generally 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1971).
32. See generally OLSON, supra note 31.
33. Tullock, supra note 20, at 228. To see why this is so, imagine a company that expects $1 
million in additional profits from a government contract that will be awarded next week. In the coming 
week, the company might start out expending $100,000 to convince policy-makers to choose it for the 
contract. However, it then learns that another company has expended $250,000, making company 2 the 
likely winner. Company 1 realizes it can expend $300,000 and still realize a hefty profit. Company 2 
responds accordingly and, through typical processes, the winning bid will be somewhere around $1 
million. To stop anywhere below the full amount of expect profits would be to leave some money on 
the table.
34. See Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 185–86 (2002) (describing the public interest theory of regulation). The 
term “market failure” has a reasonably precise definition: some circumstance that interferes with market 
mechanisms and precludes prices from adjusting to achieve efficient outcomes. See, e.g., HENRY N.
BUTLER ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 125–26 (3d ed. 2014). The term is used colloqui-
ally in far less precise fashion, often referring to any market outcome that does not match the speaker’s
normative view of what the world should look like. As it turns out, those suboptimal outcomes can be 
the result of prior government action, making further government intervention unwise. E.g., Ronald 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 8 J. L. & ECON. 1, 28 (1960) (“The kind of situation which econo-
mists are prone to consider as requiring corrective governmental action is, in fact, often the result of 
governmental action. Such action is not necessarily unwise. But there is a real danger that extensive 
government intervention in the economic system may lead to the protection of those responsible for 
harmful effects being carried too far.”). See also Kidd, Coase, supra note 9, at 149; Jeremy Kidd & 
Joseph Padgett, Trucker Shortage as Government Failure, 1 LOY. U. CHI. J. REG. COMPLIANCE 7
(2016) (arguing that the U.S. trucker shortage is the result of unhelpful Department of Transportation 
safety regulations). 
35. Kidd & Padgett, supra note 34. Other theories of regulation criticize this approach. In the 
capture theory, regulatory bodies become captive to the regulated industries, which use regulation to 
cartelize the industry and reduce competition. Yandle & Buck, supra note 34, at 186. In the economic 
theory of regulation, formulated by George Stigler, regulation is merely another tool by which produc-
ers maximize profits. Id. (“[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and oper-
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also be a tool by which powerful incumbents pursue private gain outside of 
a market context. A counter-intuitive result of legislative and regulatory 
processes is that those who bear the costs of regulation often lobby for its 
implementation.36 The earliest recorded example of this outcome is the 
London weavers’ insisting that the Magna Carta require that all cloth man-
ufactured in the realm be of uniform standards.37 Modern examples include 
biotech companies lobbying for government standards on their gene-
spliced crops,38 cigarette companies lobbying for regulation of their own e-
cigarette lines,39 and industry lobbying for environmental regulations.40
The most extreme example of this would be sellers of illegal products lob-
bying to maintain their illegal status, such as bootleggers during Prohibi-
tion.41
Regulated entities do this not because they feel guilty about supposed 
harms being inflicted on society, but because they know that new entrants 
into the market will not be able to afford the additional costs.42 By raising 
barriers to entry, the regulations entrench incumbent businesses, their mar-
ket power, and the resulting profits that come out of the pockets of con-
sumers.43 Ideally, rent-seekers would like to inhibit competition without 
any cost to themselves, such as restrictions on logging in public forests 
when you own adjacent forests that can be harvested.44 If that option is not 
available, however, an outcome that imposes higher costs on competitors 
will be sufficient, so long as you are relatively better able to bear the costs.
ated for its benefit.” (quoting George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971))).
36. Bruce Yandle, Viewpoint: Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Econo-
mist, AM. ENTER. INST. (May 1, 1983), https://www.aei.org/publication/viewpoint-bootleggers-and-
baptists-the-education-of-a-regulatory-economist/ [http://perma.cc/N928-2MCK]; Koopman et al., 
supra note 23, at 534 (“[P]owerful and politically well-connected incumbents have an incentive to 
‘capture’ the regulatory system that is supposed to constrain them. This is because, by limiting entry or 
by raising rivals’ costs, regulations can be useful to the regulated firms.”).
37. Of course, the standards implemented were those already in place in London. Id.
38. Henry I. Miller & Gregory Conko, Bootleggers and Biotechs, REGULATION, Summer 2003, at 
12.
39. Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists, Bootleggers & Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. REG. 313, 
348 (2016).
40. Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political 
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 856–74 (1999). See also A.H. 
Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen-Suit Provisions of Environmental 
Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 25 (2001) (quoting an officer of WMX, the nation’s largest 
waste management company, as supporting stricter environmental regulation because “[s]tricter legisla-
tion is environmentally good and it also helps our business”).
41. Brenner M. Fissell, Abstract Risk and the Politics of the Criminal Law, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
657, 674 (2014).
42. Adler et al., supra note 39.
43. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, REGULATION, Fall 1999, at 5, 6.
44. Id.
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Rent-seeking in the financial industry often has an additional charac-
teristic, that it is carefully hidden behind a screen of seemingly virtuous 
concerns over consumer protection. While not unique in this regard,45 the 
financial sector has been at the epicenter of some spectacular rent-seeking 
in the past fifteen years,46 all of which masked by moral outrage regarding 
the need to regulate to protect the consumer. After the scandals at Enron 
and Worldcom, populist anger led to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002,47 a statute filled with provisions that had little-to-no hope of 
affecting any meaningful change,48 and which pointedly ignored known 
solutions for the alleged problems the Act was intended to rectify.49
Similarly, in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–08, public out-
rage led to the passage of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act,50 also filled with provisions that had little chance to 
reduce “systemic risk,” the stated goal of the Act.51 Dodd–Frank imposed 
sweeping regulations across the financial sector, from corporate govern-
ance to hedge funds,52 yet appears to have done nothing to end “too big to 
fail.”53 To the contrary, it appears to have led to rising costs to consumers 
of financial products,54 a tell-tale sign of increased market power and re-
45. For example, when President Barrack Obama announced new fuel economy standards on 
May 16, 2009, those standards were cheered by automobile executives, union leaders, and environmen-
tal groups, and Obama Press Secretary Robert Gibbs opined that the diverse coalition supporting the 
changes was evidence of the virtue of the standards. Bruce Yandle, America’s New Fuel Economy 
Cartel, REGULATION Fall 2009, at 6, 6–7. The diversity of the coalition, however, could also be a sign 
that the rent-seekers have found themselves virtuous spokespeople to hide their activities. When the 
inevitable unintended consequences appear, see Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to 
John Bunyan’s Celestial City, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1517 (1998) (“The law of unintended conse-
quences decrees that the resolution of current problems will create or reveal new ones.”), it is worth 
considering that they weren’t really unintended.
46. Professor Bainbridge and others have argued that shoddy policy making in aftermath of 
market turmoil enjoys a long tradition, going back as far as the late 1600s. Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1782 (2011); 
Larry Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003).
47. Pub. L. No. 107-204,116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
48. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Govern-
ance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–43 (2005).
49. At the time Sarbanes Oxley was passed, it was known that having an audit committee mem-
ber with financial expertise had a positive impact on committee performance, but Congress did not 
include a mandate of that type. Id. at 1532.
50. Dodd–Frank, supra note 15.
51. See Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 1797–1815.
52. See Kidd, Hedge Funds, supra note 14.
53. See Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit 
Government Guarantees 6 (May 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656
[https://perma.cc/RVW5-RTA7].
54. See Todd Zywicki, George Mason Univ. Found. Professor of Law, The Dodd–Frank Act Five 
Years Later: Are We More Stable?, Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Financial Services (July 9, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2651942 
[https://perma.cc/95AP-FM5L] (describing the increased cost and reduced benefits to consumers).
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duced competition.55 Even when Congress ostensibly sets out to curb the 
power of large banks, those banks manage to leverage circumstances to 
their advantage.56
Those pushing the meaningless-but-costly provisions in Sarbanes–
Oxley were called “policy entrepreneurs” by Professors Romano,57 a
phrase adopted by Bainbridge in describing Dodd–Frank.58 Carefully con-
sidered, that phrase aptly describes rent-seeking, the application of entre-
preneurial ability in the public policy arena, rather than in the business 
arena.59 The opportunities for rent-seeking may be more pronounced in the 
wake of financial crises,60 due to politicians’ needing to do something, but 
the ability to gain special favors from government will drive rent-seeking 
whenever the government assumes the power to grant special favors. Power 
draws rent-seeking, not the other way around, and as government has 
grown increasingly powerful, the level of rent-seeking has assuredly grown 
with it. Of vital importance, then, is the question of how we can curb the 
influence of special interests in government, a question that will be an-
swered in the following section.
III. HOW INNOVATION (FINTECH) CAN HELP
One extreme way to eliminate regulatory rent-seeking in the financial 
sector would be to eliminate the financial regulatory apparatus. Take away 
regulators’ ability to intervene in the market to bestow special favors and 
market actors would have to go back to the tried and true method of earn-
ing a profit by catering to consumer demand.61 That path is foreclosed by 
55. As it turns out, Dodd–Frank managed to decimate small banks and increase the size of large, 
incumbent banks. Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, The State and Fate of Community Banking 3 (Har-
vard Kennedy Sch., M-RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 37, 2015) (“[M]any commentators, com-
munity bankers, and regulators have also expressed fear or produced research showing that Dodd–Frank 
has exacerbated the preexisting trend of banking consolidation by piling up regulatory costs on institu-
tions that neither pose systemic risks nor have the diversified businesses to support such costs. . . . Our 
findings appear to validate concerns that an increasingly complex and uncoordinated regulatory system 
has created an uneven regulatory playing field that is accelerating consolidation for the wrong rea-
sons”). Dodd–Frank also managed to hinder competition from non-traditional institutions, like hedge 
funds. Kidd, Hedge Funds, supra note 14.
56. E.g., Lux & Greene, supra note 55, at 19 (describing empirical results showing small com-
munity bank’s significant losses in lending volume and market share since Dodd–Frank).
57. Romano, supra note 48, at 1568.
58. Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 1815–16.
59. See Robert E. Litan & Ian Hemmingway, Is America Encouraging the Wrong Kind of Entre-
preneurship?, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 13, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/is-america-encouraging-the-
wrong-kind-of-entrepreneurship [http://perma.cc/498K-AEZZ].
60. Ribstein and Bainbridge refer to these laws as “bubble laws.” Bainbridge, supra note 46;
Ribstein, supra note 46.
61. SMITH, supra note 28, at 26–27.
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political reality; there is simply no appetite among the U.S. electorate, poli-
ticians, and regulators for an entirely unregulated marketplace. Some would 
oppose deregulation because they believe it is necessary to protect consum-
ers but, even if it offered no benefits to society, it would still benefit the 
legislators and regulators that are the recipients of rent-seeking expendi-
tures. Those legislators and regulators would have even weaker incentives 
to pursue full deregulation.
Given the political realities, the answer to concerns over rent-seeking 
and its harmful effects might, at all prior times in history, have been: “we’ll 
just watch them very closely and use the democratic process to police bad 
behavior.” Of course, the nature of rent-seeking, as described above, is that 
the democratic process is unlikely to make any significant change.62 All
hope is not lost, however, for the current age has one thing that could pro-
vide an antidote to rent-seeking—rapid technological innovation.
Technological innovation is nothing new, of course, and it has stymied 
prognosticators ever since Thomas Malthus incorrectly predicted, in 1798, 
that population would soon outstrip agricultural productivity and lead to 
mass starvation.63 Advances in agricultural technology led, of course, to 
dramatic increases in productivity, so that mass starvation was not only 
avoided but we find ourselves in a world where many more people face 
obesity, rather than starvation, as a more pressing problem.64
As the pace of that innovation has increased in recent years, it has also 
begun to stymie regulators in their attempts to control economic activity. 
One of the foundational principles of economics is that people respond to 
incentives,65 so at least some entrepreneurial innovation will be aimed at 
finding a way to operate in a way not covered by existing or predicted 
regulations.66 Some consider this to be an illegitimate, unethical, or even 
illegal mode of business,67 but an entrepreneur faced with high regulatory 
62. It is, after all, the nature of the democratic process—complete with concentrated benefits and 
dispersed costs—that makes rent-seeking possible.
63. See generally THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1798).




65. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ration-
ality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2000).
66. While the precise form of a new rule is often not known until its final publication, preliminary 
rules give all those affected some idea of what they will have to face in the future. Prudence dictates 
that adaptation efforts begin prior to final publication in order to minimize the total cost of the regula-
tions.
67. This mode of thinking appears to rest on the assumption that whatever is not expressly al-
lowed by government is prohibited, rather than an alternative assumption that whatever is not prohibited 
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costs will seek to avoid those costs in order to lower costs and improve 
competitiveness. So, as regulators finalize a rule, entrepreneurs have al-
ready begun to find a way to operate outside existing regulations.
This type of avoidance-innovation can gain the innovator a short win-
dow in which to enjoy increased profits as it avoids regulatory costs and 
provides something previously unavailable in the market. Even if those 
profits are eventually competed away, the ability to capture them will drive 
innovation across the market. At some point, however, the regulator will 
step in, re-imposing regulatory oversight costs. The faster the regulator 
intervenes, the lower the profits captured by the innovator and the lower the 
incentives to innovate. A free regulator might wait for a period of time to 
ascertain exactly how the innovation will affect consumers and society. A 
captured regulator, on the other hand, will intervene much more rapidly 
because the incumbent will correctly view the innovation as a threat to 
market power and will push for regulatory intervention. This will require 
some additional rent-seeking but it will likely be less than the amount of 
profits lost if the innovation gains a foothold in the industry.
Of course, imposition of regulations rarely ends innovation, so the cy-
cle merely begins anew, with more innovations that will have to be defend-
ed against by the incumbent, through the captured regulators. Three things 
should be clear from this analysis. First, so long as regulators move faster 
than innovators, an incumbent will be able to maintain control over the 
industry by way of the captured regulator. Second, a strong incumbent-
regulator bond will significantly reduce innovation in the industry.68 Third,
an incumbent who has captured a regulatory body must engage in rent-
seeking proportional to the amount of innovation in the market, giving it an 
additional incentive to squash innovation.
Consider that, in a static system—without innovation—a successful 
rent-seeker enjoys competitive advantages that can persist indefinitely. 
Whether or not the winner has to continue paying rents depends on the 
actions of other participants. If new competitors believe they have a chance 
to dislodge the incumbent, they may begin lobbying regulators, which will 
re-open the contest.69 Otherwise, the incumbent has achieved an anti-
competitive advantage for as long as it desires.
is allowed. As a counter-argument, it is possible to view the Constitutional prohibition on ex post facto 
laws, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, as a rejection of that view.
68. Innovations that come from the incumbent will not be squashed by the captured regulator, but 
greater progress would be made if innovation came from multiple sources.
69. Importantly, a regulator who enjoys the rewards of rent-seeking will want the contest to 
continue indefinitely, and might engage in rent-extraction, threatening to re-open the contest unless the 
incumbent continues to make some baseline payments. MCCHESNEY, supra note 19, at 122 (“The 
2018] ANTIDOTE TO RENT-SEEKING? 177
In a dynamic system, where innovation is ongoing, rent-seeking will
be continuous, as well. Remember that the fruits of rent-seeking are regula-
tions that impede competitors; if those competitors find a way to do busi-
ness outside of the regulatory scheme, then they have avoided the anti-
competitive costs of the regulations and the incumbent’s advantage goes 
away. One prominent example would be ride sharing services, like Uber 
and Lyft, that have largely avoided the regulatory costs imposed on the taxi 
industry. As previously noted, a captured regulator will attempt to squash
innovation with new or reformulated regulations, so the practical key to 
ending rent-seeking is rapid innovation, moving fast enough that the regu-
lator loses the capacity to intervene.70
To see why, imagine a world where innovation has just overtaken the 
speed of regulation. The incumbent sees a new innovation and pushes the 
regulator to squash it. The regulator obliges but, since the regulatory pro-
cess took some time, the incumbent emerges from that rent-seeking en-
deavor to discover two new innovations that must be squashed to maintain 
market power. More rent-seeking by the incumbent squashes the second 
wave of innovation but, given the longer period of time to issue two new 
regulations, the incumbent emerges to discover that there are eight new 
innovations. Eventually, the incumbent will realize that the appeals to the 
regulator can no longer maintain market power, that upstart competitors 
will forever be one or more steps ahead of the regulators and that all rent-
seeking expenditures are wasted resources. Accelerated innovation in this 
example means that each successive wave of innovation is larger, making 
the incumbent’s moment of realization come that much sooner. In other 
words, the more innovation outpaces regulation, the more rapidly rent-
seeking will end. The resources previously expended on rent-seeking will 
be diverted into market innovations by incumbents and smaller competi-
tors,71 resulting in lower prices and higher quality for consumers.72
overriding lesson of the rent-extraction process is that politicians are interested in any stock of immo-
bile capital or wealth from which they can extract a share.”).
70. It is too early to say whether Uber and Lyft have avoided regulatory intervention. In some 
larger cities, regulations have been imposed that curtail the availability of ride-sharing. Consumer safety 
is given as a justification, but there is little doubt that it also protects the incumbent taxi medallion 
owners. It is possible that ride-sharing technology cannot innovate fast enough to escape regulation, but 
that does not foreclose the possibility that future acceleration will reach that point.
71. The only way to sell your product in a competitive market is to provide it at a price and 
quality that consumers want. There will always be some tradeoff between the two, with some consum-
ers making their consumption decisions solely on the basis of price and others only on the basis of 
quality, but consumers generally fall along a spectrum and experimentation on those two margins is 
how businesses find out that their products are profitable.
72. Of course, Fintech innovations bestow these same benefits on their own. See Greg Buchack et 
al., Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
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In the realm of Fintech, it does not appear as though innovation has 
overtaken regulation, though that future is by no means impossible. The 
past three decades have seen technological innovation at a rate that would 
have been unthinkable prior to that time. If past acceleration continues, 
innovation must eventually overtake regulation, particularly since the speed 
of government is intentionally hobbled by the requirements of the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act.73 What will be the response if, one day, regulators 
find their efforts to be largely irrelevant, that finalization of a rule occurs 
only after it is no longer a binding constraint because innovation has 
changed the nature of the regulated industry during the time necessary to 
implement the regulation?
If we reach that point, regulators will have lost their power to inter-
vene in the market and we will have a market that is de facto unregulated. 
Existing regulations need not be repealed through formal deregulation ef-
forts if innovation renders them obsolete, and the transition could be quite 
lumpy, as different regulations would cease to be constraining at different 
times. Whether we allow the transition to occur, at all, is the subject of the 
following section.
IV. WILD WEST OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: GOOD OR BAD?
A society that knows that the innovation-regulation relationship is 
about to change faces an important decision. If then-current regulatory 
mechanisms will soon be too slow to be effective in an innovative world, 
society faces three primary paths. The first is to maintain a high level of 
control over regulated industries, adopting a prohibited-unless-permitted 
policy towards innovation. The second is to allow innovation but adapt the 
regulatory process so that it can keep pace. The third is to accept innova-
Working Paper No. 23288, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23288 [http://perma.cc/4W7U-7HJH] 
(finding some evidence that Fintech lenders are better at determining appropriate interest rates and 
originate loans with greater convenience for borrowers). If innovations also reduce rent-seeking, the 
resulting benefits will be in addition to those arising directly from the innovation. Some market partici-
pants—including the incumbent—could find that their business model makes them less capable of 
adapting to the new competitive marketplace and they will exit the market. It is possible that a self-
aware incumbent might engage in rent-seeking precisely because it knows that it cannot survive a 
competitive marketplace. Consumers should cheer that result, as consumers are the primary benefits of 
the lower prices and higher quality encouraged by competition.
73. The slow speed of required U.S. regulatory procedures is typically viewed as harmful, Mi-
chael Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed Regulation and Regulatory 
Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 355–56 (2007) (arguing that ossification—the –“reduces the 
efficiency of regulatory regimes,” “interferes with the ability of the government to pursue its chosen 
ends,” “interfer[es] with learning and regime adaptation,” is “a drag on economic efficiency” and, as a 
result, “is generally disfavored”), but there are also benefits, Aaron L. Nielsen, In Defense of Formal 
Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 260–62 (2014) [hereinafter Nielsen, Rulemaking] (describing how 
lengthy procedures are better at discovering truth).
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tion as the controlling feature of previously regulated markets and allow a 
de-facto unregulated market to emerge. Each option has benefits and costs 
which make them appropriate for some situations but not others.
A. Prohibited Unless Permitted
The potential for market failures leads many policy makers to be wary 
of an unregulated future and the harms that could be caused by innova-
tion.74 If markets fail in significant ways, the resulting efficiencies can 
potentially lead to consumer and societal harms.75 These concerns could 
lead society to choose a path that intentionally delays any innovation for as 
long as it takes for the regulatory regime to decide how to minimize costs. 
An extreme form would make all innovations illegal unless they had been 
specifically permitted by regulatory bodies.76 A less extreme form would 
simply withhold legal recognition from those innovations, forcing them 
into the grey market77 where enforcement of contracts and other property 
74. Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401, 404 
(“[R]egulatory agencies should be granted a new set of powers to regulate emerging risks.”). For a more 
lengthy treatment of the opposition to unregulated innovation, see generally Virginia Postrel, THE 
FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES (1998). A particular concern that arises regarding peer-to-peer lending is that 
it might increase the amount of household debt to unhealthy levels. See Patrick Jenkins, US Peer-to-
Peer Lending Model Has Parallel with Subprime Crisis, FIN. TIMES (May 30, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/84f696ec-2436-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d [http://perma.cc/UXR5-MGTY]. 
75. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (describing 
the complete degradation of a common resource when the resource is non-excludable). But see ROBERT 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1994) (describing ways in which informal rules arise to solve 
commons problems and other market imperfections). Many prominent commentators have argued that 
the financial crisis of 2007–08 was the direct result of deregulation. See generally, e.g., ALAN S.
BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED (2014); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE 
MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Anatomy of a 
Murder: Who Killed America’s Economy?, 21 CRITICAL REV. 330, 329 (2009). But see Paul G. Ma-
honey, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957801 [http://perma.cc/NTN8-RZ8Y] (arguing that deregulation did not 
contribute to the crisis because deregulation neither hindered regulatory bodies from adapting to chang-
ing circumstances nor substantially changed the landscape on what actions were permitted by financial 
institutions).
76. One area of regulation where this approach is the rule is pharmaceutical regulation by the 
Food and Drug Administration, where drugs cannot be marketed until they have been proven safe and 
effective. Howard L. Dorfman et al., Presumption of Innocence: FDA’s Authority to Regulate the 
Specifics of Prescription Drug Labeling and the Preemption Debate, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 586–
87 (2006). That mindset occasionally flows over into regulation of food products, as well. See Stepha-
nie Strom, Impossible Burger’s ‘Secret Sauce’ Highlights Challenges of Food Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
9, 2017, at B2 (describing the FDA’s refusal to declare a genetically modified soy burger as “safe to 
eat” because it “has never been consumed by humans and may be an allergen”). In either case, it is fear 
of the downside risk—death—that justifies the use of this restrictive choice.
77. Black markets are those markets that arise in goods that are expressly prohibited. Grey market 
goods have not been prohibited but are also not expressly recognized, putting them in a form of legal 
limbo. E.g., Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. Worthy, Applying Lessons from the Opioid Abuse Epidemic 
to Protect Consumers from Gray Market Biologics, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 375, 
378 (2015) (“In contrast to the black market, which deals in medications that start off as counterfeit, 
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rights is less certain.78 In either case, the point is to defer the benefits of 
innovation until it is clear that the benefits outweigh the costs.
The costs of this approach should be self-evident. It deprives consum-
ers of the benefits of innovation for an indefinite period,79 but the strong 
controls also provide a much more enticing rent-seeking opportunity. If the 
government has the power to prohibit that which has not been permitted, 
the winner of a rent-seeking contest will have a much stronger anti-
competitive edge because competition-through-innovation will be effec-
tively prohibited. Any incumbent will seek to make sure approval is per-
manently delayed—or at least delayed for as long as it takes for the 
incumbent to position itself to be the primary “innovator.”80 Not only will 
consumers’ lives be less rich and rewarding because they lack the new 
goods and services arising from innovation,81 but the inevitable increase in 
rent-seeking will also lead to higher prices and lower quality on all existing 
goods and services. These are significant costs, and are only countered by a 
possible reduction in the risk of market failure,82 a tradeoff that hardly 
seems profitable for society.83
the gray market supplies legitimate, legally compliant goods that are made by licensed manufacturers 
but are distributed by unauthorized dealers or to unauthorized purchasers.”).
78. Without legal recognition for the goods, it will never be entirely clear whether the executive 
or judicial branches will enforce property rights or contractual obligations.
79. It does so on the premise, described supra, that doing so is essential to protect those consum-
ers from greater harm. It is worth considering, however, that the fears of potential harms might be 
exaggerated. For example, although the lack of regulation makes some commentators fearful of another 
financial crisis, Jenkins, supra note 74, there is reason to believe that the advent of Fintech innovation 
could reduce systemic risk by “diversifying lending options,” Mark Fenwick et al., Fintech and the 
Financing of Entrepreneurs: From Crowdfunding to Marketplace Lending 5 (Tilburg Law & Econ. 
Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2017-025, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2967891 [http://perma.cc/SZ49-
588R]. Those consumers might also be protected from individual errors, with automated systems being 
less prone to mistakes. Id.
80. In a non-competitive market, the incumbent will have minimal incentive to innovate, in any 
way, but if someone else comes up with the idea, the incumbent will find a way to make it profitable, 
then ask regulators to approve the innovation, subject to restrictions that guarantee the incumbent’s
continued dominance of the industry.
81. This argument obviously denies the Galbraithian critique of capitalism—that human beings 
are not made any better off due to new products and services, but are only manipulated into thinking 
they are by cunning advertising. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 124–31 (4th ed. 
1998). Because Galbraith’s conclusions run so completely counter to both human intuition and data 
regarding improvements in the quality of life enjoyed by residents of first-world countries—improved 
life expectancy through medical innovations, just to name one—that nothing is lost by abandoning such 
an unserious claim.
82. See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 8 (“[T]here are also risks associated with new 
and untested technologies, as well as the use of existing technologies for new purposes. If left unman-
aged, these risks could pose harm to the wider financial system.” (emphasis added)).
83. The harms arising from this path are so severe that it seems unlikely that it could be main-
tained in the long run. Particularly in a world with robust communication, consumers would eventually 
revolt against the denial of benefits from innovation and innovations would shift to the grey and black 
market, notwithstanding the disadvantages of those markets. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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Fortunately, the U.S. government appears to have rejected this ap-
proach, in the case of Fintech, at least for now.84 The Obama Administra-
tion issued an official Fintech policy during its final days, in which it 
described some of the potential benefits of financial innovation: (1) “ad-
vancing discovery, learning, and economic growth”;85 (2) “improv[ing] 
access to safe, affordable, and fair capital”;86 (3) “bring[ing] efficiency and 
transparency to financing for development projects”;87 and “reducing 
costs.”88 While the Obama Framework does not entirely embrace Fintech 
as a positive development, it does encourage agencies to take steps to 
“maintain flexibility” in dealing with the financial sector.89 Similarly, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has adopted a “Policy on No-Action 
Letters,” in which it adopts a default rule of no action so long as there is 
“significant uncertainty” as to whether current regulations cover the inno-
vation.90
B. Accelerated Regulation
The second possible path we could take is the one apparently chosen 
by the Obama Framework and the CFPB No-Action policy—use the cur-
rent regulatory regime.91 There are problems with this choice if, as this 
In so doing, regulators might empower the grey and black markets to grow faster than the legal market, 
diminishing the impact of any regulation in the legal market.
84. One commentator has argued for a variation on the Precautionary model—where all new 
innovation would be prohibited until regulations could be implemented to assure minimization of 
risks—called the Experimentalist model, where regulatory agencies would prohibit immediate imple-
mentation of innovations that could “plausibly create[] a significant risk to health, safety, or the envi-
ronment,” but would also begin conducting randomized experiments to generate knowledge and 
understanding that would allow for regulation. Wansley, supra note 74, at 405. But see Vermeulen et 
al., supra note 11, at 10 (“[S]uch experimentation poses a problem for regulators. Too often, ‘success’
for regulators is defined in negative terms as the avoidance of catastrophe. Avoiding grounds for criti-
cism inevitably results in an overly cautious approach (the “precautionary principle”). From the per-
spective of entrepreneurs and consumers, such caution can be a ‘disaster’ or at least less preferable.”).
85. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 3.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id.
90. Policy on No-Action Letters; Information Collection, 81 Fed. Reg. 8686 (Feb. 22, 2016), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201602_cfpb_no-action-letter-policy.pdf [http://perma.cc/WS8F-
U4FS]. As is always the case with a transition of power from one party to the other, it is unclear how 
much of the CFPB’s policy will be maintained by the Trump Administration. The United Kingdom 
Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) has adopted a related “sandbox” policy for cryptocurrencies, 
where startups are allowed to experiment in a limited space, without being subjected to all UK financial 
regulations. Regulatory Sandbox, U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Nov. 5, 2015). 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/project-innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox 
[https://perma.cc/EGV6-H9Z8].
91. Both documents are replete with references to safety, consumer protection, stability, and even 
fairness. While they reject the rigid, permission-first approach of the first path, they continue to empha-
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essay argues, the speed of regulation is falling behind the speed of innova-
tion. If current regulatory procedures are not keeping up, then we will need 
to speed up the process,92 but it bears asking two important questions: (1) 
whether the benefits of speeding up the process are worth the costs; and (2) 
whether doing so is merely delaying the inevitable?
1. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Accelerated Regulation
A prerequisite for advocating accelerated regulation is surely a belief 
that regulation, generally, is necessary to protect consumers and the integri-
ty of the financial markets.93 It is this belief that supports the “ossifica-
tion”94 view of administrative law, or the view that existing procedural 
requirements are harmful because they keep agencies from moving quickly 
in the face of new risks.95 If the primary concern is consumer protection, 
then delays resulting from a requirement to “check off procedural boxes”96
size perceived failings in financial markets and the need for great care in determining which innovations 
will be helpful. It should come as no surprise that those possessing regulatory or legislative power look 
first to the existing regimes to solve the problem. See Cutts & Romain, supra note 11 (describing 
increasing concern about, and activity related to, Fintech in Congress and among regulators).
92. Some countries have already recognized that the speed of innovation is too much for their 
regulatory regimes, and have taken steps to grant “regulatory flexibilities” in dealing with Fintech 
innovation. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES 
(FINTECH) 74 (2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7PW9-444K].
93. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 4. See also Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, Remarks at Fintech and the Future of Finance Conference, Kellogg School of Management, 
Northwestern University 3 (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2017/pub-speech-2017-48.pdf [http://perma.cc/E2RW-24DD] (“Innovation can 
change everything, but it must fit within the company’s business plan, the risks must be understood and 
managed, and consumers must be treated fairly. That’s what I mean by responsible innovation and 
that’s what innovation must achieve for it to live up to its potential.”). To many observers, “regulation 
is necessary” and even “in the interests of fintech firms” in order to foster trust. Patrick T. Harker, 
President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Remarks at the Global Interdependence 
Center’s Payment Systems in the Internet Age Conference 4 (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/publications/speeches/harker/2017/02-06-17-gic-payment-
systems-in-the-internet-age.pdf?la=en [http://perma.cc/8RPF-RGQV]. Of course, if true, there would be 
no need for accelerated regulation for the industry would never be successful until regulated, for who 
could trust an unregulated industry? McGinnis and Roche argue that digital currencies, at least, rely not 
on trust in government regulation but, instead, on computer logic. John O. McGinnis & Kyle Roche, 
Bitcoin: Order Without Law in the Digital Age 4 (Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch. Of Law, Pub. Law Research 
Paper No. 17-06, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929133 [http://perma.cc/EH5J-YY87].
94. See Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE L.J.
2286, 2328 n.162 (2015) (collecting ossification literature).
95. Wansley, supra note 74, at 409 (“[N]otice and comment requirements are crippling when 
agencies seek to regulate emerging risks.”); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory 
Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1342, 1354 (2013) (warning of the dangers 
of “underregulation”).
96. Aaron Nielsen, Sticky Regulations, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2950732 [https://perma.cc/CX9Q-TSBJ] [hereinaf-
ter Nielsen, Regulations].
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would certainly be frustrating. Those procedural boxes, however, are de-
signed to improve the quality of agency decisions and to protect the due 
process rights of the regulated parties.97 Even many who argue for acceler-
ated regulation concede that procedural requirements can have the positive 
effect of encouraging “the rationality of agency policymaking.”98
A slower regulatory process, therefore, allows for greater deliberation 
and, ideally, better decisions. It also allows those who are the subjects of 
regulation an opportunity to have their voices heard and their perspectives 
considered before they are adversely impacted. These process and accuracy 
benefits must be balanced against the potential harms that proponents of the 
ossification view believe are inflicted on society because new regulation is 
delayed while procedural boxes are checked.99 Society must choose among 
the various speeds that can be established for regulatory processes; the 
slower speed of the APA was chosen decades ago, and society has the right 
to change its mind as the world changes. In deciding how fast regulation 
should move, however, society should include considerations of rent-
seeking, whether accelerating the speed of regulation would increase or 
decrease the power of special interests in the regulatory process. Will ac-
celerating regulation increase the power of incumbents and further reduce 
consumer welfare through restrictions on competition?
The first thing to consider in answering that question is the type of 
changes that would need to be made in order to speed up regulation. Some 
improvements will be possible through the application of technology to 
regulatory compliance, or “RegTech.”100 Other changes, however, will 
require relaxation of existing procedural protections, including lightening 
of notice and comment requirements,101 abandonment of review by the 
White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,102 and loos-
97. Id. at 2. At least one prominent scholar rejects administrative power as unconstitutional 
because, by its very nature, it subverts Constitutional protections. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT (2017).
98. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1144 
(2009).
99. For an example of this type of reasoned balancing, see Nielsen, Regulations, supra note 96
(describing both the costs and benefits to slow processes).
100. Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 1271, 1315–18 (2016).
101. See, e.g., MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32240, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING 
PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW (2013).
102. E.g., Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma,
61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1794 (2012).
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ening of the “hard look” standard imposed by the courts when reviewing 
agency decisions103—if not eliminating ex post judicial review, altogether.
The form of regulation might also change. Formal rulemaking has 
been largely abandoned because it is too slow,104 but we might also see the 
abandonment of even informal rulemaking, adjudication, and the entire 
stable of current regulatory options. Regulators have already begun to ex-
periment with new ways of achieving their goals, including regulation-by-
litigation and regulation-by-negotiation.105 More recently, regulators have 
experimented with regulation-by-Dear-Colleague-Letter,106 where instruc-
tions were disseminated to regulated entities without the force of law but 
with the threat of liability if the instructions were not followed. Similarly, 
some regulatory goals have been pursued by pressuring financial interme-
diaries to cut off banking services to entities that were not in compliance
with the regulatory goals.107
How would these and other potential changes affect the incentives of 
rent-seekers? As a preliminary matter, any acceleration in the speed of 
regulation would counter the negative impact innovation has on rent-
seeking. Rapid innovation makes regulation less effective, reducing the 
incentives to compete for rents; increasing the speed of regulation dilutes 
that impact because regulators are better able to keep pace. In terms of the 
103. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 526–27 
(1985).
104. Nielsen, Regulations, supra note 73, at 242–53.
105. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 180–83 
(2005).
106. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT (2011), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVZ6-
HGCV].
107. See Michael J. Bresnickat, Exec. Dir., Fin. Fraud Enf’t Task Force, Speech at the Exchequer 
Club of Washington, D.C. (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/financial-fraud-
enforcement-task-force-executive-director-michael-j-bresnick-exchequer [https://perma.cc/K7W5-
ETX4] (describing government efforts to foreclose access to financial institutions and payment proces-
sors “because they are the so-called bottlenecks, or choke-points, in the fraud committed by so many 
merchants”). Known originally as Operation Choke Point, it is defended with the same rationale as 
traditional regulation—consumer protection. Jeri Leigh McDowell, Insidious Design or Instrument of 
Progress: The Multi-Agency Initiative to Choke off Undesirable Businesses’ Access to the Financial 
World, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 803, 807, 811–12 (2015) (“Operation Choke Point has led to an alarming 
number of account terminations ‘based solely on politicized regulatory pressure and informal intimida-
tion related to the products and services being offered by legal, licensed and regulated businesses.’”); 
see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE’S “OPERATION CHOKEPOINT”: ILLEGALLY CHOKING OFF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS? 2 (2014); 
Todd Zywicki, The Dodd–Frank Act Five Years Later: Are We Freer? 8–9 (George Mason Univ. Law 
& Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 15-54, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2704076
[https://perma.cc/MC76-2ZYK].
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power of regulators, then, increasing regulatory speed increases power108
and should increase rent-seeking.
Accelerated regulation could also change the mode of rent-seeking. If 
regulators are making their decisions more rapidly, any attempt to tailor 
those decisions for private benefit would need to speed up, as well. Rent-
seekers would begin to abandon any semblance of nuanced, subtle persua-
sion and would compete for rents more openly, in order to gain the atten-
tion and favor of regulators. As it becomes more difficult to conceal rent-
seeking, the public will recognize more rent-seeking and resentment could 
grow. In the medium- to long-run, this would force both rent-seekers and 
regulators to be more cautious. The attention could force some rent-seekers 
out of the competition entirely, but notice that lower competition further 
empowers the incumbents who have already ingratiated themselves with 
the regulators. Those incumbents have already “captured”109 decisionmak-
ers at the regulatory agency; lowering the level of competition makes it 
harder for any shift away from the incumbent to occur.
There is a possible scenario in which accelerated regulation could re-
duce rent-seeking. A more rapid regulatory process might prove impossible 
to control, at least in its current form, with many regulatory bodies holding 
overlapping authority. The procedural requirements that must be aban-
doned to achieve accelerated regulation are useful in avoiding contradictory 
regulation; with those safeguards gone, a rapid regulation regime might be 
unmanageable. In that case, it might be necessary to implement a much 
more simplified and uniform set of regulatory requirements.110 If that out-
come were achieved, it would increase efficiency and could reduce regula-
tory discretion.111 Lower discretion would mean less power112 and,
therefore, less rent-seeking. Similarly, such simplification could also mar-
ginally increase the transparency of the regulatory system, which should 
108. It does this by increasing the discretion of the regulator. If procedural requirements are aban-
doned, the regulator will have the ability to act quickly to respond to perceived threats. Granting the 
regulator greater discretion to identify threats and act to counter them is primarily how accelerated 
regulation is achieved, but that discretion means greater power in a smaller number of hands.
109. Stigler, supra note 35 (“[R]egulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated 
for its benefit.”).
110. MCQUINN ET AL., supra note 7, at 32.
111. At the extreme, it is possible to imagine regulatory decisions being made by complex, ma-
chine learning algorithms, so that individual regulatory decisions are a function of pre-determined 
criteria, not the discretion of a human regulator. Even that outcome would have its costs, see MICHAEL 
C. MUNGER, THE THING ITSELF: ESSAYS ON ACADEMICS AND THE STATE 25–26 (2015), but a reduction 
in discretionary power would diminish the incentives to rent-seek.
112. E.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 97, at 15–17 (arguing that greater discretion to regulatory 
agencies increases their power by giving them authority to “impos[e] legal obligation through acts other 
than those of the legislature and the courts”).
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also cause some rent-seekers to decline to compete. However, lowering the 
number of loci for rent-seeking expenditures might also facilitate coordina-
tion between rent-seekers, allowing more rent-seekers to be successful.113
Regardless of which of these forces dominate, the rent-seeking hy-
pothesis argues that both the regulators and those regulated participate 
jointly in the competition, and that both sides benefit. As a result, it is un-
likely that they would voluntarily agree to an accelerated structure that 
removed the opportunity to seek special favors, not to mention the ability 
of regulators to profit from doling out those benefits. To the extent that the 
rent-seeking story presented supra is correct, it is highly unlikely that such 
a streamlined, efficient, reduced-rent-seeking outcome would be achieved 
spontaneously. Instead, it would need to be imposed by Congress. Unfortu-
nately, rent-seeking occurs just as frequently in the legislative setting,114 so
this best-case scenario is extremely unlikely.
Accelerated regulation does little to reduce the incentives to rent-seek. 
Instead, it appears to increase the power of regulators—which would in-
crease rent-seeking—and enhances the dominance of incumbent firms, 
further harming the goal of having competitive markets. There is nothing 
surprising in this result; regulatory power draws rent-seeking, and there is 
little reason to suspect that increasing the speed at which regulatory deci-
sions are made would change that foundational fact of regulation.
2. Is Accelerated Regulation Just Delaying the Invevitable?
One final question deserves to be asked with regard to accelerated 
regulation: whether accelerating the pace of regulation can ever be an ef-
fective long-run solution, even under ideal circumstances. Short of turning 
over regulation to machines,115 is there any way to realistically match the 
113. The process would be akin to legislative logrolling, wherein legislators trade votes in favor of 
each other’s pet projects. Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 803, 808–09 (2006). Log rolling almost certainly leads to greater successful rent-seeking. 
In the rent-seeking scenario, the rent-seekers themselves could coordinate, with powerful incumbents in 
different industries combining forces to increase the pressure for benefits to be granted to all members 
of the coalition.
114. Jason S. Oh, The Social Cost of Tax Expenditure Reform, 66 TAX L. REV. 63, 98 (2012) 
(“When drafting legislation, Congress is not immune to the pressures of rent-seeking—law making is a 
cooperative process between Congress and lobbyists.”).
115. A lesser form of this—RegTech—is already occurring, Arner, et al., supra note 100, and 
more advanced forms should be feasible in the future. Turning over compliance to machines might have 
the advantage of reducing the cost of compliance, id., but more interesting is the question of whether 
machine learning could be used to determine the content of regulations. Were society to choose that 
path, of course, rent-seeking could still occur, but it would occur at a different point, in designing the 
machine algorithms that would determine what interests to weigh most heavily. All rent-seeking activi-
ty would be directed at that single point.
2018] ANTIDOTE TO RENT-SEEKING? 187
speed of innovation in a world where machine learning is an everyday real-
ity? Once innovative forces have been released into a regulated industry, 
there is no way to know where it will end, but machine learning has the 
potential to increase the speed of innovation beyond what human intellect 
can achieve.116 It is therefore possible that the accelerated-regulation path is 
illusory, that any potential societal gains will be short-lived, as innovation 
continues to accelerate in a way that regulation simply cannot. If so, then 
society will eventually face a choice between a rigid, permission-first re-
gime and de facto deregulation, as described below.
C. De-Facto Deregulation
Whether or not we approve, our society may be heading towards a 
world in which financial services are able to avoid substantive regulation 
through continuous innovation. Government has the tools to slow or stop 
that innovation, but only by imposing significant costs on consumers, mar-
kets, and society. It may also be that the speed and power of innovation are 
stronger than regulatory power, so that government would retain only the 
pretense of power. There is hope that government agents would fairly bal-
ance the costs and benefits of the available regulatory paths and abandon 
futile paths, but the realities of rent-seeking make that hope a dim one.
What, then, do we do in the face of a future that many will find dis-
tressing? The right answer may be “nothing.” This section proposes to offer 
both reassurance and consolation to those who find that answer distressing. 
Reassurance, in that an unregulated market may not be as horrible as imag-
ined. Even the phrase “unregulated” isn’t entirely accurate, since reputa-
tional factors continue to constrain market participants, even in the absence 
of government regulation, and private ex-post regulation—tort law, for 
example—would still remain and could be modified to adapt to a world 
without government regulation. Consolation, in that any costs arising from 
de-facto deregulation might be countered by a reduction in the ability of 
established financial firms to rig the system in their favor.117
1. Don’t Fear Markets
Fear of unregulated markets is quite common in all sectors of society, 
but it may be the result of long-standing misunderstandings of what mar-
116. For a description of some of the ways machine learning algorithms can learn and, potentially, 
outpace human thought, see Bruckner, supra note 6; and Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 84–88 (2017).
117. Neither will fully assuage the concerns of those who distrust markets.
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kets are and do, as well as a romanticization of government interventions. 
Most importantly, generations of economists have—intentionally or not—
convinced millions of undergraduate students to think of “markets” as 
some sort of quasi-tangible thing that strives to achieve things like “eco-
nomic efficiency.”118 The obscure way in which economists describe mar-
kets makes it much easier to vilify markets as secretive, easily-corrupted 
organizations that look out only for the well-connected.119
Consider how perspectives might change under an alternative descrip-
tion of markets as the aggregation of billions—possibly trillions—of volun-
tary interactions every day.120 No formal structure, no organization, just 
everyone on earth making daily decisions in search of a better life, and 
success requires selling something people want in a way that allows poten-
tial buyers to trust you. These markets are far too complicated—billions or
trillions of moving parts—to manipulate for the benefit of small groups. 
Similarly, there is no secrecy in markets, just diffusion of useful infor-
mation across so many people that no one can know even a small fraction 
of the total.121 None of this is to say that markets are perfect—far from 
it122—but, in a free market, the overwhelming complexity of the system 
means that any imperfections cannot be the result of conscious efforts to 
manipulate. Those without an understanding of the nature of markets will 
try their hands at manipulation, inevitably without success.
If a market does not provide the optimal outcome,123 it may be that 
some natural obstacle has arisen and government can prove useful in re-
moving that obstacle. However, it may instead be that the problem is not of 
118. While many economic analyses use efficiency as a criterion, it is often difficult to understand 
precisely what the term means, except in very general terms. For a helpful explanation of what the term 
often means and why it is helpful in the context of discussions regarding markets, see Kidd, Coase,
supra note 9, at 145–46.
119. Lee Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to Employers’ Labor 
Market Restraints in Sports and Non-Sports Markets, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 617, 623 (relating that the 
Sherman Act was intended to protect individuals “from the evils of accumulated corporate wealth and 
power in all markets”).
120. JAMES BUCHANNAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN, in 7
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN ¶ 7.2.4 (1999), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv7c2.html [https://perma.cc/KF8D-WP2L].
121. See generally LEONARD READ, I, PENCIL (1958). For a more in-depth treatment of the ques-
tion, see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC 
ORDER 77–91 (1980). 
122. Common sources of market imperfections are spillover effects (positive and negative exter-
nalities), non-excludability alone (the commons problem) or paired with non-rivalry (under-provision of 
public goods), and barriers to entry (monopoly power). See generally Koopman et al., supra note 23 at
532.
123. It is tempting to think of “optimal” in terms of “outcomes I personally prefer.” However, it is 
not always the case that a distasteful outcome is evidence that markets have failed. Humility requires 
that we accept that some outcomes might be better, as a general matter, even if we disagree. 
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natural origin, but was created by government. An underappreciated contri-
bution of Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase was the important reminder that 
market “failures” are often the logical-but-unforeseen results of a prior 
government action.124 If so, further government actions may be just as like-
ly—or more likely—to generate additional problems instead of solving 
existing ones. Indeed, to the extent that prior rent-seeking is the culprit, 
further government endeavors on the relevant question may further en-
trench the incumbent’s interests to the detriment of consumers.125
If, instead, government adopts a largely non-interventionist stance,126
individual transactions will only occur when both parties believe that they 
will be better off in the aftermath.127 In the absence of fraud, coercion, or 
other cases where the transaction is not really voluntary, a free market will 
make all parties better off, but what of those cases where the parties have 
bad information? In many cases, the lack of good information makes it 
harder128 to justify an argument in favor of perfectly free markets. As 
Coase made clear, when transaction costs129 are high, there may be a role 
for government to play in establishing correct rules.130
The difficulty of deriving correct, useful information can be a barrier 
to voluntary transactions, but one of the primary aims of Fintech is reduc-
tion in transaction costs.131 If potential customers think they that they are 
124. Coase, supra note 34. See also Kidd, Coase, supra note 9, at 150–51. For example, occupa-
tional licensing requirements can result in a shortage of professionals in some occupation, but the 
shortage is the result of the government policies, not the inability of the market to adapt perfectly to the 
policy.
125. Id. at 152–53.
126. Except for cases of fraud, coercion, and the like, where government enables parties to seek 
redress or invalidate contracts.
127. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (6th ed. 2003).
128. Though not impossible. While perfect information is often cited as a necessary condition of 
well-functioning markets, e.g., Alexis Brown Stokes, An Apple a Day Keeps Shareholder Suits at Bay: 
An Examination of a Corporate Officer’s Legal Duty to Disclose Health Problems to Shareholders, 17 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 303, 315 (2011) (“Market efficiency only occurs when participants have 
access to perfect information.”), no individual can possibly have perfect information, see generally
Read, supra note 121, yet most markets function well even though each individual has only a small 
amount of information. HAYEK, supra note 121.
129. For an explanation of the term “transactions costs,” see Kidd, Coase, supra note 9.
130. Coase, supra note 34, at 18.
131. Financial intermediaries exist to minimize a number of transactions costs, notably the cost of 
connecting those with excess funds and those who need additional funds, but also moral hazard and 
adverse selection, including the uncertainty regarding credit-worthiness of the borrower. Craig R. 
Everett, Group Membership Relationship Banking and Loan Default Risk: The Case of Online Social 
Lending, 7 BANKING & FIN. REV. 15, 22–25 (2015). Once a loan has been made and the borrower 
begins to pay, the lender develops better information about the borrower’s actual risk of default; rather 
than sharing that information with the market, the lender keeps it so that the borrower cannot pursue 
lower interest rates from other lenders—a phenomenon known as the “holdout problem.” Id. at 15. 
Peer-to-peer lending, a Fintech innovation, provides many more lenders—including microlenders not 
previously present in the market—with knowledge of borrowers’ preferences and needs. By reducing 
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likely to be victims of financial fraud, or if they think that it is impossible 
to obtain good information, they will avoid financial markets,132 reducing 
individual well-being and long-term growth. This is a potential market 
flaw, but that also means that it is an untapped profit opportunity, because 
each transaction avoided for this reason is a transaction that could have 
benefitted both parties.133 A third party who establishes a reputation for 
providing useful information could take a percentage of the benefits de-
rived from new transactions.
In the Internet age, information has never been more available, and in-
formation technology innovations will make the task of information verifi-
cation easier and cheaper,134 reducing transaction costs and making 
regulation in this area largely superfluous. Indeed, it is worth considering 
that private entities have better incentives than government to get infor-
mation correct. A private firm that fails to provide accurate information 
will go out of business in a free market no one will voluntarily contract 
with it when more reliable options are available.135 Conversely, govern-
ment regulators rarely face adverse consequences when things go badly,136
even when the poor outcomes are the result of the regulators’ intervening to 
the finding costs, peer-to-peer lending should drive down the interest rate paid by the borrower and 
raise the interest rate received by the actual owners of funds. Id. at 18; see Adair Morse, Peer-to-Peer 
Crowdfunding: Information and the Potential for Disruption in Consumer Lending, 7 ANN. REV. FIN.
ECON. 463 (2015). Peer-to-peer lending also reduces default rates, indicating a reduction in adverse 
selection and/or moral hazard. Everett, supra, at 51. Importantly, however, peer-to-peer lending has 
apparently not yet solved the holdout problem, id. at 51–52, but an innovator who can do so will attract 
far more borrowers and earn a hefty profit by reducing that transaction cost.
132. This is a variation of the “lemons” problem, identified by economist George Akerlof in The
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). The 
insight eventually garnered Akerlof a Nobel Prize. See Don Carmichael, Competition and Adverse 
Selection in An Online Lending Market (June 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2985908 [https://perma.cc/A2N2-N5C5].
133. Bad information, or bad computational use of that information, can also lead to lending that 
ends in default, which is also a missed opportunity for profit. Fintech innovations have improved de-
fault rates from those achieved with only credit scores, but there is still room for improvement. Atay 
Kizilaslan & Aziz Lookman, Can Economically Intuitive Factors Improve Ability of Proprietary Algo-
rithms to Predict Defaults of Peer-to-Peer Loans? (July 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (finding 
that characteristics of the borrower and macroeconomic indicators can add accuracy to default predic-
tions). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987613 [https://perma.cc/AMT2-47GG ].
134. Koopman et al., supra note 23, at 540–41 (“[T]he Internet largely solves this problem by 
providing consumers with robust search and monitoring tools to find more and better choices. These 
tools lower both search costs and transaction costs associated with commercial interactions.”). Even the 
dangers of information overload can be resolved through effective filters.
135. Id. at 541–42.
136. See David S. Hilzenrath, Eight SEC Employees Disciplined Over Failures in Madoff Fraud 
Case; None Are Fired, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/seven-sec-employees-disciplined-on-failure-to-
stop-madoff-fraud/2011/11/10/gIQA3kYYCN_story.html?utm_term=.013764e06656
[https://perma.cc/4H27-5E5P]. It is unclear whether anyone at the SEC was fired as a result of the 
failures leading up to the financial crisis.
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protect favored rent-seeking firms.137 A de-facto deregulated financial mar-
ket could make financial transaction not only cheaper but safer, as well.
2. A Word of Comfort to the Unconvinced
For those who struggle to accept such an admittedly-optimistic view 
of free markets,138 it is worth considering that there may be no way to avoid 
an unregulated financial sector short of imposing strict—and costly—
restrictions on innovation. If so, then it can be a source of comfort that, at 
the very least, the future of finance is one in which powerful players no
longer have the option of asking government for special favors. There are 
certain to be some problems that arise in a market without effective regula-
tion,139 but that will no longer include corruption and cronyism.
Large players in the industry, to the extent they are capable of ade-
quately serving customers without the backing of government regulators, 
will survive. Hopefully, they will do more than survive, but put their re-
sources to much better use than seeking anti-competitive favors from gov-
ernment, adding to the flow of useful innovations. Any company that 
cannot succeed except by harming competitors and consumers through 
collusion with government can and should fail, making room for new par-
ticipants who can compete in the new, faster paced financial markets of the 
future.
V. CONCLUSION
Fintech is coming, and its approach is a source of concern for many. 
For regulators and incumbents, those concerns are valid, because innova-
tion requires additional regulation and a corresponding increase in the 
amount of rent-seeking expenditures that the incumbent must make. If the 
most optimistic estimates are correct, the coming waves of innovation will 
137. See Kidd & Padgett, supra note 34 (arguing that current trucking shortages are the result of 
government regulations motivated, in part, by a desire to serve the interests of railroads, the primary 
competitors of the trucking industry).
138. To be clear, while it is an optimistic view, it is not a utopian view of markets. After all, 
markets function not because individuals care for each other, but because it is in their self-interest to 
cater to the needs of others. SMITH, supra note 28, at 16. But see ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS 166 (Prometheus Books 2000) (1759) (“Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to 
be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love. . . . He desires not only 
praise but praise-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, how-
ever, the natural and proper object of praise.”).
139. Markets are never perfect, after all, even if they outperform government regulation. Arnold 
Kling & Nick Schultz, Opinion, Markets Fail. That’s Why We Need Markets., CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Dec. 28, 2009), https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1228/Markets-fail.-
That-s-why-we-need-markets [https://perma.cc/46LK-92RX].
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do more than just inconvenience regulators and incumbents, but could wipe 
away the complex structure of rent-seeking benefits that have been built up 
over time. If innovation begins to outpace regulation, incumbents will no 
longer be able to use government’s monopoly on force to extract extra rev-
enues from consumers. Regulators will no longer have the power and dis-
cretion to force small competitors with great ideas be forced to comply 
with unreasonable regulatory demands that are designed to delay innova-
tion for the benefit of the large incumbents.
More than anything, these potential changes would dramatically im-
pact consumers. By reducing the ability of incumbents to stack the deck in 
their favor, rapid innovation would raise consumer welfare through cheaper 
and safer financial products. Legitimate concerns exist regarding the ability 
of market players to engage in fraud in an unregulated market, but those 
concerns must be balanced against the reality that attempts to curb fraud 
and abuse will be used by incumbents to impede competition and harm the 
very consumers the regulators seek to protect. Innovations should be wel-
comed, especially when they take the form of market enhancements that 
reduce transaction costs and destroy the ability of powerful interests to 
rent-seek their way to wealth at the expense of consumers.
